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ABSTRACT 
International trade in agriculture open markets abroad for producers and suppliers. However, the capacity to 
serve these markets are not evenly distributed. For many exporters it is a challenge to access foreign markets 
and connect to global value chains (GVC). Agricultural markets are often characterised by asset specificity and 
oligopsonic market structures. These are features that tend to imply hierarchic governance structures and 
asymmetric dependencies.  Thus, for the exporters, how to engage with partners in order to access foreign 
markets becomes critical. In this paper we explore how three export initiatives from Norwegian agriculture 
coordinate and connect to global value chains. We discuss the mode of governance, as well as the role of 
middlemen. We further discuss the characteristics of the coordination and the strategic implications for the 
exporting partners. The three cases are export of Whey protein concentrate (WPC 80) from Tine SA, export of 
the genetic material (The breed Norwegian Red) from Geno SA, and cured meat of lamb legs (fenalår) from the 
company Fenalår from Norway SA. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural exports, WPC 80, Fenalår, Norwegian red, Global value chain, Governance, 
Intermediaries in international trade  
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Introduction 
Globalisation and international trade in agriculture open for accessing new markets abroad for producers and 
suppliers. However, the capacity to serve and handle these markets are not evenly distributed. Producers and 
suppliers from smaller economies and countries with comparative disadvantages in agriculture seems to 
struggle to succeed in foreign markets. The challenges are multifaceted. In general, there are entry barriers 
related to language, distance, information and knowledge. Therefore, various forms of intermediaries 
sometimes seem necessary to establish the links between producers and customers abroad and between the 
exporters and importers (Ahn, Khandelwal et al. 2011, Antràs and Costinot 2011, Bernard, Grazzi et al. 2015). 
However, agricultural markets are often characterised by asset specificity and oligopsonic market structures 
(Rogers and Sexton 1994, Vukina and Leegomonchai 2006, Constance 2008). These features tend to imply 
hierarchic governance structures and asymmetric information and dependencies (Williamson 1996, Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005), and adds risks to the costs of using intermediaries in international trade. The 
core of global value chain (GVC) governance is issues of control over, and access to, transactions (Humphrey et 
al. 2005). For small exporters and producers, this implies that it is a challenge to access the foreign markets and 
organizationally connect to global value chains (GVC) without losing control of their business. They may find 
themselves between a rock and a hard place.  
Taking exporting activities from relatively small producers as the point of departure, the questions we ask in 
this paper is therefore, first, how can we describe the governance of global value chains for agricultural 
exports, and second, what are the role of intermediaries in the governance of global value chains structures. 
Theoretically, this paper contributes to the field by combining the already rich literature on GVC governance 
following e.g. the influential article by Gereffi et al. (2005), with issues from a growing body of literature on the 
use of intermediaries in international trade. Applying this approach to three cases of agricultural exports from 
Norwegian agriculture, we were able to perform a methodologically sound plausibility probe of a new 
approach to the role of middlemen in international agricultural trade.      
Norway do not have comparative advantages in agriculture. It has little and scattered agricultural land, 
unfavourable climate, and high labour costs (Forbord and Vik 2017). Thus, it is not surprising that we do not see 
a lot of export from Norwegian agriculture (Eldby and Tufte 2007). Yet, there have been a series of attempts to 
create exports from Norwegian agriculture, but many have failed (Kjus and Kvam 2010). The challenging 
situation for Norwegian agricultural trade makes it both empirically and theoretically interesting to explore the 
approach to cases of Norwegian export. Thus, in this paper, we study how three export initiatives from 
Norwegian agriculture coordinate and connect to global value chains. We describe and discuss characteristics 
of the coordination, the use of intermediaries, and the strategic implications for the exporting partners. The 
three cases are, first, export of whey protein concentrate (WPC 80) and permeate powder (PP), from the 
Norwegian farm owned cooperative and dairy company Tine SA. WPC 80 and PP constitutes rare but successful 
export commodities from Norway (see also Vik and Kvam 2017). Second, export of genetic material for the 
cattle breed Norwegian Red, by GENO SA, also a farm owned cooperative, and the breeding organization of 
Norwegian Red, the main dairy breed in the country. The third case is export of cured meat of lamb legs 
(Fenalår) to the French delicacy market, through the company “Fenalår from Norway” that is established by 
nine meat processing companies.  
We continue the paper with a presentation of our theoretical framework and the literature underpinning it. 
Thereafter we present the data and the methods used on the three cases. Then, we present and analyse the 
three cases in some more detail, before we discuss the findings and conclude. 
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Literature and theoretical approach 
International agricultural trade means that domestic producers and processors connect with a series of other 
actors domestically and abroad. As Feenstra put it,  “the rising integration of world markets (has) brought with 
it a disintegration of the production process in which manufacturing or service activities done abroad are 
combined with those performed at home” (Feenstra 1998: 31). The domestic actors need to build new 
partnerships abroad to access international markets and are thereby becoming parts of global value chains 
(GVC). In the literature, the nature of the governance in GVCs has been described as some kind of continuum 
ranging from hierarchies to markets, with various network variants in-between (see e.g. Williamson 1975, 
Williamson 1996). Following the influential article by Gereffi et al. (2005), where a framework for analysing the 
governance of global value chains where developed, a series of studies of GVC governance has been 
undertaken. (Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008, Gibbon and Ponte 2008, Gebreeyesus and Sonobe 2012, Gereffi 2014, 
Ponte and Sturgeon 2014, Pananond 2016, Bair 2017, Mayer and Phillips 2017, Mayer, Phillips et al. 2017, 
Mosley 2017, Posthuma and Rossi 2017).  The framework of Gereffi et al. (2005), builds on various variables 
that influence on dependencies and power relations in GVCs: complexity of transactions, codifiability and 
control of information, the capacity of the suppliers, and asset specificity. The logic is to a large degree related 
to insights from the industrial organization literature on transaction cost economics,  that uses e.g. the concept 
of asset specificity to hypothesise on how organisations and management will unfold (Williamson 1989). In the 
ideal market, there are no lasting relationships, and the hazards of transactions are not too problematic. With 
high asset specificity however, as we often see in food markets, investments are irreversible in the short run. 
Suppliers of specific assets become dependent on the buyers, who have the power to hold-up the suppliers, 
and therefore, asymmetric dependencies and uneven power relations arise between actors. In general, 
consequences of high asset specificity may be higher degree of hierarchical forms of governance, and less flat 
and heterarchical organisational forms (Vik 2006).  
Gereffi et al. (2005) describes five types of global value chain governance, ranging from the “market” on the 
one side, to the vertically integrated hierarchies on the other, with three in the middle: modular value chains, 
relational value chains, and captive value chains. Gereffi et al. (2005) uses complexity of transactions, 
codifiability of transactions, capabilities among suppliers, and degree of explicit coordination from a lead 
partner to determine which model is more likely (table 1). 
Table 1. A typology of GVC-governance (after Gereffi et al. 2005) 
Transaction 
complexity 
Codifiable 
transactions 
Supplier 
capabilities 
Governance types 
low high high Market 
high high high Modular 
high low high Relational 
high high low Captive 
high low low Hierarchical 
 
Transactions in an ideal market are typically done one at a time and at arm’s length. No lasting relationships 
are necessary. Since both supply and demand are easily accessible, there are no risks related to transactions, 
opportunistic behaviour or lack of information. One can hypothesise that competition replace contracts as 
coordination mechanisms. According to Gereffi et al. (2005) the transactions are marked by low transactional 
complexity, codifiable transactions, and high capacity in the supply base.  
In the second type, the modular chains:  
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“(…) suppliers make products to a customer’s specification (…). However, when providing ‘turn-key 
services’ suppliers take full responsibility for competencies surrounding process technology, use of 
generic machinery that limits transaction specific investments (…). It is possible to codify complex 
information that can be exchanged with little coordination” (Gereffi et al 2005: 83).   
In this type of relationship, the cost of switching to new partners remains relatively low. Partners in the GVC 
may continue business with other partners, without fundamental risks or losses.   
The next type Gereffi et al (2005) describes as relational value chains. These are value chains where the 
transactional complexity is high, the possibility to codify transactions are small, and supplier capability is low.  
“(W)e see complex interactions between buyers and sellers, which often creates mutual dependence 
and high levels of asset specificity. This may be managed through reputation or family and ethnic ties” 
(Gereffi et al 2005: 83).  
Therefore, this is a type of governance where there are strong ties and dependencies. This situation makes 
switching more difficult due to relationships and asset specificity.   
The third “network” type in the typology is what Gereffi et al. call captive value chains. In such chains,  
transaction complexity is high, there are difficulties in codifying transaction, and the competencies among the 
suppliers are relatively low.  
“In these networks, small suppliers are transactionally dependent on much larger buyers. Suppliers 
face significant switching costs and are, therefore, ‘captive’. Such networks are frequently 
characterized by a high degree of monitoring and control by lead firms.” (Gereffi, et al. 2005: 84).   
Due to the oligopsonic characteristics of many agricultural markets, both in the primary sector (Rogers and 
Sexton 1994), and in industry and the end markets (Constance and Heffernan 1991, Dixon 1999, Olsen 2015), 
the captive value chains seem to be a usual configuration in agricultural value chains.  
The fifth type is a fully vertically integrated firm, and this is the expected organisational form when transactions 
complexity are high, codifiability is low, and the supply base competencies are low. In these cases, the 
combination of incentives points towards tight integration and control – a vertically integrated firm.  
In the GVC theories, intermediaries play significant, but implicit roles. International trade theory, on the other 
hand, has largely treated the value chain implicit. It has been usual to assume that a manufacturer or producer 
ship their products directly to customers abroad, while we know that this is not an accurate description of 
reality (Abel-Koch 2013). Producers use, to varying degrees, intermediaries. However, in recent years the 
econometric international trade literature, the role of networks (Chaney 2014), intermediaries, traders and 
middlemen has been given an increasing role (e.g. Antràs and Costinot 2011). Spulber (1996) defines an 
intermediary as “…an economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or that helps buyers 
and sellers meet and transact” (Spulber 1996: 135). Clearly though, intermediaries and middlemen do play an 
important role in facilitating international trade (Spulber 1996; Ahn, Khandelwal et al. 2011), and thereby 
constitutes essential elements in global value chains. 
Which firms  uses intermediaries in international trade? Abel-Koch (2013) finds that smaller firms, new 
exporters, and exporters of low quality goods tend to use intermediaries more often than other exporting 
firms. For such exporters building a distribution network of their own involves high fixed costs. Much of the 
same type of logic is found in Bernard, Grazzi and Tomasi 2015), who finds that intermediaries are more likely 
when there are destination-specific fixed costs, less differentiated products, and low “contract intensity”.  
The described trade economy literature does not explicitly address which types of intermediaries, middlemen 
or traders we may expect in GVCs, or what their specific role would be. Neither do the GVC governance model 
of Gereffi et al. (2005). Combining the two approaches may provide a fruitful ground for suggesting some 
hypothesis on the role and type of intermediaries to expect in various form of GVC governance types. 
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Schematically, we may state that, first, the pure market model implies that there are no incentives for 
middlemen at all. With low transactional complexity, high competencies with suppliers, and easily codifiable 
transaction – and a market like governance type - adding the costs of an intermediate into the working of the 
GVC make little sense. The ideal market are not in need of intermediaries  Also in the other opposite of the 
spectre, we do not expect to see middlemen – but for different reasons. In the vertically integrated hierarchy, 
where there are high complexity of transactions, difficulties of codifying transactions, and low supplier 
capacity, the incentives to take control of the entire value chains are large enough to expect that there will be 
no middlemen involved. The producer and the salesperson belong to the same organisation. For the three GVC 
types in the middle, we may expect to find intermediaries – although with different roles.  
First, as stated above, when the market and the products are characterised by transactions that are easy to 
codify, the suppliers have high capabilities, and there are high transaction complexity, the model predict a 
modular governance model. The complexity of transactions do however suggest that an intermediary is 
necessary. Yet, the codifiability of the transaction suggest that the intermediate have a relative neutral and 
passive role – an intermediary in the true sense of the word. The role is to connect sellers and buyers. Second, 
if the situation is similar to the one described for the modular GVC, except that the transactions are less 
codifiable, the intermediary need to take a larger role to reduce risk related to the transactions. The 
intermediary must do more to facilitate the transactions. Third, when we have a captive GVC governance type 
situation, the transaction complexity is high, but the possibilities for codifying the transactions are also high. 
This alone implies a modest role for the intermediator. However, combined with low supplier capacities we 
may expect that the intermediaries to have a controlling role on behalf of the partner controlling the GVC. This 
may be both because the lead partner have the possibility to do so due to power asymmetries, and because it 
is necessary in order to support the suppliers. In addition, the captive nature of the GVC suggest that the lead 
partner may hold an advantageous strategic position?, and possibly extract larger surplus from this, and that 
the intermediaries take a role in cementing this situation. The theoretical expectations are summed up in table 
2.       
Table 2.A typology of middlemen roles and GVC-governance  
Governance types Transaction 
complexity 
Codifiable 
transactions 
Supplier 
capabilities 
Role of 
middlemen 
 
Market low high high - 
Modular high high high connecting 
Relational high low high facilitating 
Captive high high low controlling 
Hierarchical high low low - 
 
The original model of Gereffi et al (2005:90) did have a dynamic element. GVCs may evolve due to changes in 
circumstances and strategies among the partners. Actors tend to struggle for improvement of their strategic 
situation. Changing the transaction complexity, the codifiability of transactions, and the capabilities will open 
possibilities for reconfigurations of GVC governance. We may also suggest that the choice of type of 
intermediaries may be used strategically both to alter and to cement modes of governance.  
Below we will present the empirical cases from Norwegian export, and discus the feature of the GVC 
governance, the role of intermediaries, and the dynamics of the models based on these case studies.  
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Methods and data 
Method:  
In terms of method, this paper is a comparative case study (Moses and Knutsen 2007) where we follow 
products from three exporting firms in Norway. Defining a case is notoriously difficult (e.g. Eckstein 1975). In 
our study, the three export initiatives and the GVCs through which they take place constitutes the cases.  What 
we do is to follow the products and those who manage it from production and distribution to it reaches the 
middlemen or customers abroad. This is in accordance with a perspectives that the social and material 
complexities of global markets requires studies of both actors and devices involved with production, and 
logistics of the commodities (Callon 1998, Callon, Millo et al. 2007, McFall 2009). We assume that through such 
studies we will be able to generate insights on the governance of a global food chain. All our three cases are 
cases of export from Norwegian agriculture, where the three exporting firms are farmer owned. The choice of 
these cases means that we keep several general variables constant; The products all stem from a protected and 
subsidies sector – Norwegian agriculture, through basically the same agricultural policies, and they come from 
a sector with relatively poor record of exports – which probably has influenced business culture, expertise on 
markets, and export procedures, etc. On the other hand, factors such as the products, type of transactions, and 
end markets are highly different. This give us the possibility to reflect upon the significance of these 
differences. 
Our analyses is set up to explore the plausibility of new combinations of a set of theoretical proposition derived 
from the literature.  Clearly, a comparative case study with three cases cannot alone neither verify nor falsify 
the theoretical expectations. However, it may serve as a plausibility probe (Eckstein 1975, Moses and Knutsen 
2007). Furthermore, it gives us the room for exploring the logic of the propositions in its context.  
Data and cases 
We build on data from interviews (Kvale 1997, Galletta and Cross 2013) and material on the actors published in 
open company web sites. Our first case is export of WPC 80 and PP from Tine SA. In the case study we 
interviewed people closely connected to the production and export of whey products, totally eight people.  In 
Tine, we interviewed six people on four different locations. (1) the commercial director of  “Tine Ingredients 
division” in Oslo; (2), the export manager and an (3) export coordinator from Tine’s export division in Oslo; (4) 
one production chain manager at Tine’s Prognoses Department (Tine OPV) located at the production facility in 
Trondheim; (5) the manager at Tine Verdal, a production facility that is one of two production sites for whey 
powder processing in Norway, (6), a process leader at the production facility. This interview was followed up by 
a tour to see how the production process in the factory took place. We also visited Arla Foods Ingredients (AFI) 
main office in Vieby, Denmark. There we conducted two interviews: the Category director for WPC80 and a 
sales manager responsible for sales of permeate powder. All interviews were personal, tape recorded and 
transcribed. Main interviews with the director’s at Arla and the director at Tine lasted about two hours. The 
other interviews lasted from 1 to 1.5 hours. In addition, we collected data from brochures, annual reports, 
homepages, etc.  
Our second case is export of the speciality product “Fenalår” (cured meat of lamb legs). This export initiative is 
organised from an organisation named “Fenalår from Norway”, which is a joint project consisting of nine 
producers of fenalår in Norway. Three of them have joined forces to export their products to France, and this is 
the initiative we have studied in this case. The data gathering process started with an interview with the chair 
of board, who also serve as manager of the Innovation division of Nortura SA (a large farmer owned meat-
producer cooperative). He invited us to join the group of three firms on a marketing and sale trip to France. 
During this tour, we visited existing and potential customers at delicacy shops and restaurants in Paris and 
Strasbourg, were we made observations and talked to several actors: We made personal interviews with the 
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representatives of the three exporting firms joining the trip (Nortura, SA, Bjorli Fjellmat AS, and Tind Spekevare 
AS). Additionally we made interview with a representative from the company “Saveurs de Norvege”, which 
served as an intermediary and facilitated the visits to potential customers during the four-day’s visit. Saveurs 
de Norvege is a French company owned and run by two Norwegian women living in France. Their aim is to 
support Norwegian export of quality food to the French market. After this trip, we made  two follow-up 
interviews with the chair of board and the manager at Tind Spekevare. All interviews were tape recorded and 
transcribed. In addition, we collected data from brochures, annual reports, homepages, etc.  
The third case, represented export of genetic material for the breed Norwegian Red through the cooperative 
and breeding organisation Geno SA. In the study of Geno, we made personal interviews with the Chief 
Operating Officer International (COO), leading the International Operations & Business Development team and 
one of his colleagues. Later, we made a phone interview with the chief veterinarian at Geno responsible for 
controlling the export product, and that the health certificate for the bulls is according to the order.  
Additionally we collected data from the homepage of Geno.  
Results and case analyses 
Tine SA and the export of WPC 
Tine SA is one of Norway’s largest food companies. It is a full-scale supplier of dairy products with well-known 
brands in the Norwegian market. Tine is owned by about 11 000 dairy farmers and is organized as a 
cooperative. They have more than 1,300 product lines and produce at 30 dairies located all over the country 
(Tine Annual Report, 2014). Most of Tines products are produced for domestic consumption. There are a few 
exempts from this; Jarlsberg cheese and whey based products. In 2010-2013, two of Tines production facilities 
underwent major investments to produce WPC 80 and permeate powder (PP). In the export of whey products 
Tine cooperates with Arla Foods. Arla Foods is an international dairy cooperative, owned by farmers located in 
many European countries and production in 13 countries. The main office is located in Vieby, Denmark. The 
division, Arla Food Ingredient (AFI) is responsible for whey-based products in Arla and has 650 employees 
where about 127 are located at the main office. AFI sell products worldwide, and have factories and sale offices 
all around the world. AFI became an independent division within the Arla Foods Group in 2011. AFI have their 
own factories to process products, and a designated R&D-division for product development.  
Production and transactions 
WPC 80 and PP are products derived from the production of white cheese. To make white cheese, one need to 
separate the milk, by adding rennet or an acid. When the milk separates due to a coagulation of casein, the 
next step is to “collect” (some of) the solid parts which become cheese, while most of the liquid is a protein rich 
leftover called whey.  The next step in the production is the ultrafiltration process used to separate protein 
from the rest of the whey. This is done by “squeezing” whey through large filters able to separate the whey on 
a molecular level. When this is done the liquid protein are sprayed into tanks raging 7.5 floors high, for drying 
of the powder by using a spay-drying technology. When the protein is dried, the powder contains minimum 80 
percent protein and become the WPC 80. 
The new filtration technology made it possible to develop new products, as the WPC 80 and PP, and the 
markets for them.  Thus, whey-based products are developing in a close cooperation between the R&D 
department and the customers. WPC 80 is a high value product, while permeate has been seen as more of a 
low-value ingredient, that mainly is used as ingredients in the food industry. Over the last years Arla has 
invested in factories and technology that make it possible to produce lactose from permeate that give higher 
value products – e.g. for the pharmacy industry.  
Both for WPC 80 and PP, when processing is finished, machines automatically pack the product in labelled 25 or 
1000 kilos sacks, before they go to the store. Tine purchase the sacks, but both the design and the decisions on 
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type of packing and labelling lies at AFI. There are many specifications and demands to follow in the production 
process to reach the quality standards defined by AFI. Tine has to analyze each batch and a certificate of 
analysis (COA) follow the product to the export market. Tine conduct bacteriological and chemical tests to 
ensure the quality of the product during the production process. Tine take some tests themselves and send 
some to Eurofins, but has a plan to conduct all tests themselves in the future. Other important quality issues is 
traceability of all products, and that the products meet kosher and halal requirements. For Arla, kosher and 
halal requirements is important because they want to avoid setting up different production and distribution 
chains for different markets. For Tine Verdal this means that they have to change the type of rennet they use to 
start the initial separation of the milk.  
Tine has a system for weigh and labelling for each batch produced. Each batch has its own series number, and 
each sack and pallet has its own etiquette with the series number and information about quality and 
production information. Tine receive a new etiquette on each batch when they receive an export order 
forwarded by Tine’s export division. They use different etiquettes for different export country. The etiquettes 
inform about country of destination and a shipping address.  
Tine’s prognoses division (Tine OPV) is important for coordination of the production and the value chain. Tine 
OPV produces 12-months rolling production plans based on expected milk supply at each dairy site specified at 
weekly production. This plan, which Tine transfer to AFI via SharePoint, show expected production per week. 
AFI return sale prognoses at product level based on sale and expected sale in the future. These prognoses show 
an article number for each country, so Tine OPV know to which country the products have to be transported. 
Tine incorporate the sale prognoses into their production-planning tool, Each production site is informed about 
how much they have to produce to satisfy demand from AFI. Tine OPV and Arla arrange skype/phone meetings 
every 14 days to coordinate plans and orders. Additionally, Tine provide the production sites with 4-week 
rolling plans specified on week volumes to produce. Tine OPV organize and coordinate the production, while 
Tine export division handle orders from AFI and export documents. The export division handle orders from AFI, 
billing and customer clearance. Tine’s export division receive the orders from AFI by e-mail. These are specific 
according to type of product, amount, batch and export country. Tine’s export division use the etiquettes 
agreed on with AFI that inform customer about product name, batch, quality, durability. Languages vary. Tine 
export division register information in a system online with Norwegian Customs. There they feed in data about 
volume, type of product, value and customs tariff. If the information is accepted, they receive a receipt from 
the system showing that it is accepted and ready for export. The products need to be followed by a proof that 
the product is customs declared. This declaration is transferred to the production site, and one copy follows 
the transporter, and one goes to AFI. The batch-lists are sent to AFI to confirm that the right products and 
batches are exported. When Tine Verdal or Tine Jæren have loaded the goods on a trailer, they send Tine 
export division information about the number on the order, date, and a number of the container.  
The documents from Tine’s export division and Tine’s production sites is necessary for importing the product 
into a new country. AFI define the routines connected to transportation and documentation, and Tine follow 
their specifications. Tine export division has yearly meetings with AFI where established routines are discussed 
and adapted if necessary.  
Partnership and Capabilities 
Tine and Arla have a partnership agreement that has lasted from 2008. All partnerships have pro and contras. 
The fact that Tine has renewed the partnership with Arla implies that the advantages was seen as larger than 
the disadvantages. However, there has been lengthy process of negotiations before the agreement was 
renewed, that suggests that Tine was not satisfied with all parts of the cooperation. The so-called “price 
model” for WPC 80 was one of the problematic themes. Another point of dissatisfaction was the informational 
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asymmetry between Tine and Arla on market issues. Tine do not have access to information about the end 
users.  
On the upper side, from Tines point of view, it is clear that AFI has invested substantially in the relationship 
with Tine. Since the agreement was established, they have supported, and continues to support (with 
knowledge and expertise) the development of the new production facilities in Norway. They have also invested 
heavily in infrastructure, logistic systems and quality systems to manage and make the whey products float as 
effortless as possible from Tines production facilities to AFI’s customers.  
Tine, the type of GVC, and role of intermediaries  
Tine and Arla established a partnership in 2008. Before that, Tine used independent traders as middlemen for 
selling whey powder in the export markets. As an intermediate for Tine, AFI does much more than an 
independent trader does. They manage and organize the customers, the actual transaction, and they organize 
substantial parts of the quality control. They also interact in the prognoses and production planning. At the 
same time, they work as a gatekeeper vis a vis the market.  
The GVC governance clearly fits the description of a captive global value chain. The complexity of transactions 
are high, the codifiability is also high, but the capabilities of Tine – in this particular market and in this relation 
is relatively low.  Arla is the lead partner that control access to the market and the transaction in the 
relationship. They do much more than helping buyers and sellers meet and transact.  
Geno SA and the export of Norwegian Red 
Geno SA is a farm-owned cooperative with 9000 Norwegian cattle farmers as owners, established in 1935. 
Geno is also the breeding organization of Norwegian Red, the main dairy breed in Norway. Norwegian Red has 
had a balanced breeding goal for the last 40 years. This has resulted in a breed with good production, health 
and fertility traits, and a product exported around the world. Geno is involved in research programs involving 
animal breeding, quantitative genetics, molecular genetics, reproduction and biotechnology in close 
cooperation with Norwegian universities, other research organizations and companies as well as international 
universities and research institutes. Investment in research has resulted in several biotechnology companies 
where Geno has full or partial ownership. The Geno group now consist of Geno Global Ltd. and SpermVital Ltd. 
Geno SA own 52% of Cryogenetics Ltd.  
SpermVital AS was founded by Geno and the SINTEF Group in 2003. Together, these two companies have 
developed an insemination technology for artificial insemination of domestic animals that extends the life of 
spermatozoa after insemination. This makes timing of insemination less critical concerning ovulation in the 
female and increases the odds of fertilization success. To achieve this, sperm cells are immobilized in a natural 
substance before cryopreservation. For the herd owner, this translate to reduce insemination costs and 
improved herd fertility, both factors that lead to increased profitability. Geno uses genomic selection that is the 
most advanced genomic technology. With this technology, it is possible to detect individual attributes by 
looking at the gen. For developing this technology, Geno has invested between 40 – 50 mill NOK in different 
R&D projects financed by EU, the Norwegian Research Council, and Innovation Norway has supported the 
development. The Chief Operating Officer (COO) think the decision to invest in genomic selection in 2009/2010 
was decisive for the existence of Geno as a breeding organization today. Geno Global Ltd. was established in 
2003 to handle all exports of Norwegian Red genetics with SpermVital technology. The company has today 
three employees in Norway, one in Holland and two in the US. Additionally there are six employees in a Dutch 
daughter company. The last two years the export from Geno has exceeded sale in Norway. A goal for growth is 
to double sale internationally the next 3-4 years. 
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Transaction – complexity and codifiability 
The process of collecting, producing and exporting is relatively complex. The bulls for sperm production are 
picked out when they are three mounts based on properties of their DNA. The bulls comes from farms all over 
Norway. Geno transport the bulls to their performance test station. There they stay until they are sexually 
mature, between 14-16 months. During this period, they go through many tests. 115 of 230 bulls enrolled for 
testing are selected for semen collection and ultimately progeny testing. They undergo comprehensive health 
and quality checks. Then they arrive at the Geno artificial insemination centre. Then their life as sperm 
producers start. Here they produce semen for collection once or twice a week. Each semen collection provides 
8-10 billion sperm cells, corresponding to 400-800 insemination doses for inseminating individual cows. Once 
the bulls have produces 2100 doses of semen, they are moved to the waiting bull facilities to await results of 
progeny testing. Based on results, bulls with the highest total breeding value becomes the elite bulls and they 
are moved to the elite bull facilities.  
When the semen is collected from the bull, it is analyzed under a microscope before being extended and put 
into plastic straws. Each straw represents one insemination dose, which contains approximately 12 million 
sperm cells.  The semen in straws is frozen to -196 C and stored in liquid nitrogen where it can remain 
indefinitely. All handling, transport and delivery of semen is done in liquid nitrogen.  
Norwegian red is generally of good quality. Yet, access to new markets are demanding. Documentation is 
important for sale, and Geno has not enough knowledge about how Norwegian Red function in countries with 
e.g. a different climate. The economic conditions of agriculture is also highly variable and knowledge of this is 
important for success in the market.  
Geno International buy genetics from Geno SA. This product they sell to distributors and partners in different 
countries. Some countries require more documentation than others do. Some countries demand 
documentation of absence of diseases that does not exist in Norway.  Then Geno have to send blood from the 
bull to The Norwegian Veterinary Institute to check. The Norwegian Authorities check these documentations 
when demanded. Other countries may have very specific demands for documentation, for example China. 
Norwegian Food Security Authority (NFSA) focus especially in infection fuse and traceability, i.e. not mix sperm 
from different animals. The chief veterinary at Geno is approved by NFSA to follow up regulations and 
controlling deviation in Geno. Geno is also EU-approved, which mean that the breeding station of Geno fulfill 
demands from EU regulative 88/407. Thus, Geno can export sperm to EU-countries without additional tests.  
Norway may use EU’s Health Certificate (HC) system that make it easy to pass EU-boarders.  
When the product is to be exported, a health certificate (HC) for the bull(s) accompanies the sperm.  NFSA 
control the certificate and if it is according to the order, they seal the package, stamp and sign the HC that is 
added.  NFSA control each of Geno’s orders for export and visit Geno nearly every day to control products for 
export. 
Partnership and Capabilities 
Geno Global has reorganizes its export organization the last years. Before 2016 Geno Global had three 
daughter companies in England, The Netherland and Italy – the most important markets, and distribution 
partners (intermediaries) in more than 30 countries worldwide. The established organization was expensive 
and faced a huge investment to increase sale. For a small actor in the market such as Geno large investment 
was seen as risky. The export organization changed when Geno signed a distribution agreement in 2016 with 
the world leading genetic company, PLC, from UK. The mother company is Genus PLC and was originally a 
cooperative in the UK. Eight countries were included in this agreement, meaning that that PLC is responsible 
for sale and distribution to the following eight markets for Geno’s products: US, Canada, UK, Italy, France, 
Germany, Australia and New Zealand. This represents some of the most important export markets for Geno. In 
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Italy and UK where Geno had daughter companies these we shut down and employees included in PLC’s sale 
division. The daughter company in Holland still exist with six employees.  
Geno, the GVC, and role of middlemen  
The current intermediary for Geno is the larger company Genus PLC. However, the relationship is not captive. 
Despite the difference in size and global markets shares it seem to be e relationship between equal actors – 
‘relatives’. The GVC governance is a result from a situation with complex transactions, transactions that are not 
easily codifiable, and high supplier capabilities. It is a relational partnership, and the intermediaries role is one 
of facilitating international sales – not controlling on behalf of the importing partner.   
Fenalår from Norway  
Fenalår is a traditional Norwegian product – salted and dried meat of lamb legs. The history of Fenalår from 
Norway (FFN) start back in 2006. Then, Nortura, the farmer-owned meat cooperative, initiated the process to 
qualify Fenalår for the Norwegian label Protected Geographic Indication. Many of the meat processing 
companies producing Fenalår were interested in joining the process. This resulted in that nine meat-processing 
companies established the cooperative Fenalår from Norway SA in 2008. Increased sale both to the Norwegian 
market and export markets was part of the plan. Fenalår was granted PGI in Norway in 2012, and in late 2017, 
the product was granted status as PGI in the EU, meaning that it is recognised as a traditional product from 
Norway.  
The export initiatives has focused on the French delicacy market, i.e. in Anessi, close to Genève, Paris and 
Strasbourg.  Due to a very high price level in Norway, it was necessary to focus on markets willing to pay a high 
price for the product.  
The Partnerships  
The  three companies exporting to France are: Nortura , the farmer-owned cooperative for meat producers in 
Norway. It has about 5000 employees and is a big actor compared with the other two companies joining the 
export effort. Tind Spekevare is smaller meat processor, with about 30 employees that has about 1.5 % of the 
Norwegian market on cured meat.  
The exporters used the company Saveurs de Norvege, as intermediaries in their exporting efforts. Saveurs de 
Norvege has experience from working with the Norwegian fish processing companies Salma and Lofoten in 
successful export of fish to the French delicacy market from before.  According to the chairperson of FFN, 
Saveurs de Norvege has an important network of contact persons in the restaurant and catering market, and to 
retail and other relevant customer for FFN.  Saveurs de Norvege has organised and joined several meetings 
with potential customers. Additionally, Saveurs de Norvege has arranged regularly demos in some delicacy 
shops. Another actor that has supported FFN in France is Innovation Norway in Paris – a public organisation 
that work to support Norwegian industries both abroad and at home. Innovation Norway in Paris has arranged 
happenings where it has been possible to market the products, and for journalists and bloggers to write about 
the product. These efforts have had some effects on request from potential customers from France, and other 
South-European countries.  
Transactions 
The sales manager at Tind spekevare has been the one that has organised the practicalities for export to 
France. He has worked with organising the logistics, freight, customs, fees, cooling, co-packing with fish etc. 
When exporting, Nortura and Bjorli send products ordered for export to Tind where Tind pack the products and 
send all papers in advance to the forwarder to secure everything is ok. All necessary information must follow 
the packages. When FFN receive orders, they must control that the recipient is an accepted importer. The 
products are sent to Pagborg in Denmark where further transport is organised to different wholesalers in 
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France. The products are distributed together with fish export from Norway. This implies that Tind has to take 
on extra packaging to avoid the taste and smell of fish.  
The quantities exported are relatively small so far. In 2017, the sales were around 1000 kg for all three 
companies.  
The GVC of Fenalår and the role of middlemen 
The transaction complexity is relatively high. Fenalår from Norway is a new and unknown product in the French 
delicacy market. There are no culture for using this product and thus it is challenging to communicate the high 
value. Therefore, to success in selling the product it is decisive with direct communication with customers 
(Kvam, Magnus and Stræte, 2104). Talking with the producers and listening to the history of the product 
strengthen the perception of the value of the product and the willingness to pay. The situation described above 
also make codification challenging at this early stage of export.  Although the exporters are skilled producers, 
they have very limited resources and competencies when it comes to export- and market knowledge. Based on 
the features one should expect the GVC to be of a hierarchical (or captive) nature according to the model of 
Gereffi (2005) Yet, we see that the cooperation with Saveurs de Norvege is more of a modular nature. The role 
of the intermediator has been restricted mainly to bringing together the producers and the customers.  
It also belongs to the story that the cooperation with Saveurs de Norvege ended in late 2016 because FFN 
lacked the resources to continue the business relation with Saveurs de Norvege.  Innovation Norway refused to 
continue funding the export initiative, and consequently, the cooperation with the intermediary stopped. 
Currently FFN  handle the export without intermediaries and act as a hierarchical GVC.  
Discussion 
Dynamics of GVC-governace and role of middlemen 
In the case of WPC 80, and even more PP, we see export of a bulk product. However, due to substantial 
research, and product and market developments, driven by Arla, the complexity of transactions and market 
relations increase. The new practices of engineered food, and what Scrinis (2013, 2016) label an era of 
nutritionism, adds substantially to the complexity. The numerous new uses for food additives such as WPC and 
PP results in a constantly developing market for the products, This, in turn, imply constantly evolving 
transactions reducing the codifiability of transactions. Furthermore, we see that Arla do keep a tight control of 
the access to information on market and market transaction, which makes it difficult for Tine to develop 
market competence and capacity. For this value chain though – based on the model, it is not much that points 
to a movement away from the current captive value chain. Tine could get out of the relationship, but that 
would most likely also mean that they moved to a role of a bulk supplier – less complexity – but also less value-
added.  
When it comes to the use of intermediaries there has been a development. Tine earlier made use of 
independent traders as intermediaries. With the Arla- cooperation this changed. Now, AFI serve as the 
intermediary. The role is also changed. AFI has a much larger role than an independent trader would have. 
They manage the sales process; provide managing systems used in production and distribution, and work as a 
control instance and as a filter between production and sales. In this case, though, it seems that Tine has 
traded independence for access to AFIs market position. 
Fenalår from Norway is a new product with high quality and price, in a new market combined. Transactions of 
food specialities – especially new ones – is relatively complex.  The possibility to codify the transactions are also 
limited due to the product novelty and the low volumes. Furthermore, the capabilities of the suppliers are 
rather low – when it comes to issues of trade and market. Altogether, theoretically, this should indicate a 
hierarchical value chain. What we have seen is a modular chain, where the suppliers are in charge of the 
process, and take full responsibility for competencies surrounding the product, the production process, and the 
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export, while they relied heavily on external help to access the buyers in the market. However, after some time 
they stopped the relationship with their middlemen, and changed towards a hierarchical chain, where they 
have full control of the process.  
The case of Geno is a case where transactions are complex and require specific knowledge from production to 
use. The possibility to codify the necessary transactions and knowledge is low and the specificity is high. The 
capacity of the supply base on the other hand is low – when it comes to handling the market – but high in 
terms of knowledge. According to the GVC theory of Gereffi et al (2005) this should make us expect that the 
governance of this value chain took the form of a hierarchy or a captive value chain – maybe with the supplier 
(Geno) as the lead firm. Interestingly though, this used to be the case with Geno. Before the changes in 2016, 
they had control of the value chain themselves. However, due to the challenges of dealing with the markets 
everywhere around the world they started to cooperate with a market leading actor, and have thereby gone 
over to something like a relational value chain  
In all cases – independent of the nature of the products – the exporters are, or have been, depend on the 
services of others to access the market. In the case where the actors knew the market well from the beginning 
– the case of Geno – they found it too demanding to serve the markets by themselves. In the case of Fenalår 
the exporters needed support and assistance in order to get the initial connections with the market, but may 
be able to serve markets with high willingness to pay. Notwithstanding, the relative small volumes, and the 
unfamiliarity with markets tend to create a disposition for use of intermediaries and entering into asymmetric 
dependency positions.  
 
The study presented here has combined a model of GVC governance with inputs on the use of intermediaries in 
international trade. Using this in an explorative comparative case study indicates that this is a fruitful frame for 
analysing the mode of governance and use of intermediaries in global value chains. Our case studies has also 
showed that we may build hypothesis on the role of intermediaries in international trade based on the 
described model.  
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